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Abstract: Germany has a record of more than 40 years of below-replacement 
fertility and annual death surplus. Hence, it is commonly accepted that Germany’s 
population will decline considerably in the coming decades. Recent increases in 
immigration may, however, challenge the offi cial long-term demographic projections 
for Germany. This paper assesses the impact of a permanent higher-than-expected 
level of net immigratio n to Germany as in the past three years on the projections for 
population, age structure and ethnic makeup by mid-century.
The paper adds a higher immigration variant to the Federal Statistical Offi ce’s 
latest Coordinated Population Projection and two variants of a (a) constant or (b) de-
creasing fertility rate among migrant women. It can be shown that with permanent 
net migration as high as in recent years (around 300,000 per annum), Germany’s 
population would not signifi cantly decrease in the coming decades but would rather 
remain at 80 million until 2050. On the other hand, the sharp rise in the old-age de-
pendency ratio is only mildly weakened by increased immigration rates. This issue 
is therefore probably best addressed by other (or additional) means. The increase 
in retirees will level off after 2035 in any case. The ethnic makeup of society would 
be affected to a greater degree than its age composition: The share of fi rst- and 
second-generation immigrants among the total population is projected to rise to 
about 35 percent in this scenario (and to above 40 percent if the third generation is 
also counted).
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1 Introduction
Every year since 1972, deaths have outnumbered births in Germany.1 Since then, 
the total fertility rate (TFR) has remained constant at around 1.4 children per wom-
an. While fertility decline is witnessed by all societies in the course of demograph-
ic transition (Dyson 2010), the case of Germany is exceptional with respect to the 
length and consistency of this period of below-replacement fertility and excess of 
deaths over births. In most other developed countries, the onset of natural popula-
tion decline has occurred signifi cantly later, if at all. The fi rst post-war year in which 
natural population growth was negative in Russia was 1992, in Italy 1993, and in Ja-
pan 2007. Some countries, such as Sweden or Denmark, have returned to birth sur-
plus after brief episodes of negative natural population growth while others, such 
as France or the United Kingdom, have not had notable periods of post-war death 
surplus years. In a European comparison, most northern and western European 
countries have signifi cantly higher birth rates than Germany, while many central-
eastern and southern European countries are characterised by comparatively low 
fertility rates, but have witnessed the onset of fertility decline much more recently 
(see e.g. Goldstein et al. 2009). Moreover, some of the latter countries are currently 
experiencing a recovering fertility rate after a period of “lowest-low” fertility as a 
result of birth postponements, an effect that appears to have slowed down since 
the late 1990s (Goldstein et al. 2009; Sobotka et al. 2011; Bongaarts/Sobotka 2012). 
Thus, in an international comparison, Germany stands out as the country with a his-
tory of more than 40 years of negative natural population growth and a total fertility 
rate that is consistently below 1.5 children per woman. It is beyond the scope of 
this article to investigate the reasons for this exceptional process and the apparent 
futility of all pronatalist governmental policies. Rather, the purpose of this study is 
to investigate whether a permanently high level of net immigration, as in the past 
three years, may prevent population decline until mid-century despite this quite 
spectacular record of a continuous birth defi cit.
So far, the impact of fertility decline on society and the economy has arguably 
been rather low. In 2012, both the absolute and relative sizes of the workforce were 
at record highs in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013c: 115). This indicates 
that Germany is still at a point in demographic transition where the economic bene-
fi ts arising from the decline in the young dependent population are not yet fully can-
celled out by the growing retirement-age population (the so-called “demographic 
dividend”, see Bloom et al. 2003): The dependency ratio (aged 0-14 and 65 or older 
relative to the working age population aged 15-64) is currently (0.51) still lower than 
in 1970 (0.57), before the onset of negative natural population growth. However, 
this will dramatically change in the coming two decades, when the baby boomer 
1 This and the following statement refer to West Germany before and unifi ed Germany after 1990. 
The fertility rate in East Germany was higher prior to 1990 (Kreyenfeld 2004), but in total, East 
and West Germany still displayed a consistent death surplus since 1972. Data sources for this 
and the following statements are Statistisches Bundesamt (2013d) and United Nations (yearly).
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cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s retire. Between 2025 and 2035, 13.4 million 
people now aged 45 to 55 will drop out of the labour force (assuming a retirement 
age of 67 and ignoring future migration and pre-retirement age mortality), while 
only 6.9 million – about half that number – of currently 0 to 10 year olds will enter 
the workforce. This obviously poses a great challenge to the pay-as-you-go pension 
system and Germany’s export-oriented economy. The number of taxpayers will 
shrink disproportionately compared to a sharp increase in retirees, and companies 
may struggle to replace their retiring employees. Furthermore, population decline 
will affect some geographical regions and branches of the economy more than oth-
ers. The number of college graduates in the fi elds of social sciences, law and eco-
nomics, for instance, has more than doubled between 1995 and 2011 (from 50,400 
to 114,200) in Germany, while the number of engineering graduates has risen only 
mildly during that same period (from 50,600 to 65,100; see Statistisches Bundesamt 
2012a: 44-45). It can thus be assumed that a shortage of labour will more likely hit 
sectors recruiting from the latter group as opposed to the former (which is already 
the case to some extent, see Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2013).2
It should be noted, however, that population and labour force decline do not 
necessarily have only negative consequences in the eyes of public opinion (see, 
e.g., Coleman/Rowthorn 2011). All other things being equal, population decline may 
lead to, among others, a decrease in housing prices, less traffi c, and less pollution. 
Moreover, if the demand for labour does not decrease in equal proportions, a de-
cline in the labour force may lead to an increase in wages or a falling unemployment 
rate. While we cannot elaborate in greater detail on the likelihood or the desirability 
of such outcomes here, it should be emphasized that not every aspect of population 
decline and aging needs to be perceived as negative by a majority of the population. 
Offi cial projections estimate the population will drop from currently more than 
80 million to between 65 and 70 million by 2060 (medium variant, lower and up-
per limit, see Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). The prospects of a declining German 
population are widely considered to be beyond question and are communicated 
as such in the media (see, e.g., Spiegel 2008; FAZ 2010; New York Times 2013). In 
recent years, however, immigration to Germany has risen to a considerably higher 
level than the offi cial projections had assumed. In 2013, deaths outnumbered births 
in Germany by around 200,000; yet in the same year, immigrants outnumbered 
emigrants by 437,000, constituting the largest net immigration rate since the early 
1990s and a remarkable increase since the year 2009, which had seen more emi-
grants from than immigrants to Germany (see Fig. 1). That year, the Federal Statisti-
cal Offi ce (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009) estimated the latest Coordinated Popu-
lation Projection. The models included two assumptions with regard to external 
migration: one variant assumed a net immigration of 100,000 from 2014 on, while 
2 A shortage of skilled labour may be even more severe in branches that traditionally recruit from 
the German dual system of vocational education (as already reported in Bundesagentur für Ar-
beit 2013), given the recent sharp increase in tertiary education: The share of college entrants 
within each cohort rose from 29 percent to 43 percent between 2000 and 2011 (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2012a: 15). 
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the other variant calculated 200,000 from 2020 on. Probably unforeseeable in 2009, 
the actual annual net immigration to Germany in the years 2011 to 2013 by far sur-
passed the rate assumed in the higher immigration variant of the offi cial projection. 
It is uncertain whether migration infl ows will continue at this level. On the one 
hand, improving economic conditions in southern Europe may lead to less labour 
migrants especially from Greece, Spain, and Italy as compared to the recent years 
since the onset of the fi nancial crisis. Moreover, the countries in central-eastern and 
southeastern Europe – from where Germany currently receives the most migrants 
– are themselves characterised by aging populations and their future emigration 
potential may therefore decrease drastically. On the other hand, unrestricted access 
to the German labour market for Romanians and Bulgarians since 2014 may at least 
in the near future give rise to labour migration from these countries, as has been the 
case with Poland and other EU-10 countries since 2011, when labour market restric-
Fig. 1: Net immigration and natural population growth in Germany, 1991-2013
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tions for these citizens were dropped.3 Furthermore, the repeated refugee ship trag-
edies off the Italian coastlines and the civil war in Syria, among other events, have 
led to debates about less restrictive asylum regulations. Finally, while the migration 
potential may decrease in central-eastern Europe, the opposite is likely to be true for 
Africa and the Middle East in the coming decades, given the prospects for popula-
tion growth – especially in the age group 20 to 35 – in these regions, which has been 
shown to infl uence migration rates (Cohen et al. 2008; Mayda 2010). In any case, we 
should consider the possibility that the offi cial projections underestimate the long-
term immigration rates to Germany. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate how 
ongoing higher net immigration rates would affect the demographic prospects of 
Germany and its ethnic makeup.
2 Research design and methodology
The purpose of this study is to show how the offi cial population forecasts for Ger-
many would change were there permanent higher-than-expected future immigra-
tion rates of a magnitude as in recent years (2011 to 2013). It therefore follows the 
Federal Statistical Offi ce’s (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009) 12th Coordinated Popula-
tion Projection, adopting all its major assumptions but adding a higher immigration 
variant and two variants with regard to fertility among migrant women. 
2.1 Defi ning ethnic minorities
Apart from the consequences for the total population size, these projections also 
seek to assess the impact of immigration on the ethnic makeup of Germany’s popu-
lation. One of the biggest diffi culties of this task is defi ning ethnic groups and the 
rules for assigning them to individuals. There are different approaches to this topic 
based on differences in underlying concepts of national or ethnic identity as well 
as on national laws and customs of data collection. In Germany, at least two his-
torical factors have infl uenced the defi nition of racial and ethnic minorities. On the 
one hand, there was a long tradition of an ius sanguinis nationality law, such that 
children born to foreigners in Germany were not granted German citizenship by 
birth unless they had some ethnic German ancestry (see, e.g., Brubaker 1992). On 
the other hand, after the racially motivated persecution in the Nazi era, German 
authorities usually refrain from using concepts such as race or ethnic ancestry in 
offi cial censuses or surveys. As a result, until recently ethnic minorities in post-
3 Yearly infl ows from Poland had been quite constant in the years before the 2004 enlargement, 
when they increased to 125,000, up from 88,000 in 2003. 2011 saw another signifi cant increase, 
when 163,000 people entered the country from Poland, as compared to 115,000 in 2010. The 
most recent value (189,000 in 2013) is twice the fi gure of 2003 (cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 
2014b). Needless to say, there is no guarantee that this trend will be lasting, nor that a similar 
increase will occur with regard to Romanian and Bulgarian migrants from 2014 on, especially 
since a large number of Romanians had already migrated to Spain and Italy in the previous 
decade. 
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war Germany have been almost exclusively analysed by looking at residents with 
foreign citizenship. This worked well for a long time, given the fact that even most 
second- or third-generation native-born residents of foreign origin did not hold Ger-
man passports. This has changed, however, since the introduction of ius soli-type 
elements, i.e. German citizenship by birth to children of foreign parents under some 
conditions, to German nationality law in the year 2000. Among 25-35-year-old Ger-
man-born residents with at least one foreign parent, for example, only a minority 
(41 percent) were German citizens in 2012. However, this fi gure rises to 88 percent 
among the age group of 0 to 10 years (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a). The Federal 
Statistical Offi ce introduced the concept of “migration backgrounds” in 2005, which 
covers both foreign- as well as native-born residents of Germany with at least one 
foreign or foreign-born parent (excluding all persons who themselves or whose par-
ents came to Germany before 1950, e.g., as expellees from central-eastern Europe 
in the aftermath of World War II or in previous migration waves, which were appar-
ently not assumed to be relevant for analysing the current ethnic diversity in Germa-
ny). Data on residents with “migration backgrounds” come from the micro-census, 
a household survey with a sample size of around 1 percent of the total population. 
Survey questions on “migration backgrounds” were fi rst included in 2005.
Since offi cial statistics on ethnic affi liation based on self-ascription as used in the 
U.S. census do not exist in Germany, this study works with the concept of “migra-
tion backgrounds” and uses this defi nition as a proxy variable for “ethnic minority 
status.” Obviously, no assertions can be made regarding subjective ethnic identity 
or cultural assimilation among people of migrant or mixed origin in the future, or the 
possible changes in future public discourse with regard to those labelled “minority 
members.” This paper addresses the quantitative question of how many future resi-
dents will be fi rst- or second-generation immigrants, depending on future levels of 
immigration and fertility among migrant women, but we do not intend to speculate 
here whether this will be of any sociological signifi cance in the future. The study 
thus looks at:
• fi rst-generation immigrants, defi ned as future newcomers to Germany in ad-
dition to foreign-born residents already living in the country, 
• second-generation immigrants, defi ned as native-born residents with at 
least one foreign or foreign-born parent, and
• persons with migration backgrounds, defi ned as being either of the above.
The migration background concept as used by the Federal Statistical Offi ce also 
applies to the third generation in cases where at least one of the parents, despite 
being native-born, is a foreign (or naturalised) citizen. As the percentage of sec-
ond-generation immigrants with (exclusively) foreign nationality is rapidly declining 
(from 59 percent to 12 percent among children aged 0 to 10 in the past 20 years), the 
proportion of third-generation immigrants covered by the offi cial defi nition will di-
minish as well. For the sake of simplicity, all children born to second-generation im-
migrants in the future are therefore treated as natives in this projection. Moreover, 
the impact of future unions between natives and immigrants is neglected. Mixed 
unions may lead to a numerically higher proportion of migrant-origin residents.
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2.2 Data and methods
The offi cial population projections are based on traditional point forecast models 
which vary several key parameters and designate the resulting variants as “high,” 
“medium,” “low,” etc. It has long been argued that a stochastic approach, indicating 
confi dence intervals and probability estimates, is preferable for long-term popula-
tion forecasts (e.g., Lutz et al. 1998; Keilman et al. 2002). However, estimating long-
term prediction intervals for future immigration rates – which are the main scope 
of this article – is more diffi cult than projecting parameters such as the number of 
births or the old-age dependency ratio, as these are path-dependent factors that in 
most cases do not change abruptly, while immigration rates are highly sensitive to 
unpredictable changes in push- and pull factors such as economic growth, political 
violence and war, or migration-related policies in various countries.
Projections for future immigration rates can be based on expert estimates or 
surveys among potential migrants, or they can use empirical data on past migration 
fl ows to develop forecasting models based on demographic, geographic, economic 
(such as wage and employment differences) and other factors (e.g., linguistic simi-
larities, past colonial ties, civil war or human rights violations, stock of migrants al-
ready living in the country as an indicator of migration networks; see, e.g., Pedersen 
et al. 2008; Brücker/Siliverstovs 2006; Cohen et al. 2008). These factors themselves 
must be projected into the future by certain routines or expert judgments that are 
associated with some degree of uncertainty, whether quantifi able or not. For in-
stance, Brücker/Siliverstovs (2006: 49) assume constant unemployment and GDP 
growth rates for sending and receiving countries in their projection of future migra-
tion fl ows to Germany. Future empirical deviations from such assumptions add to 
the amount of unexplained variance in the various econometric models (39-50 per-
cent in the case of the aforementioned study) due to unobserved factors, which 
inevitably exist despite the vast number of variables and model specifi cations that 
the authors consider. 
It is therefore not surprising that the recent substantial increase in immigration 
to Germany has not been predicted by these models. For instance, Brücker/Siliver-
stovs (2006: 50) projected a sharply declining net migration potential from the ten 
central-eastern EU accession countries (i.e., the new member states of 2004/2007 
except Malta and Cyprus) to Germany from 98,000 in 2010 to 29,000 in 2015. The 
actual fi gure for 2010 was even below the projected number (80,000), but the re-
cent increase to 189,000 in net infl ows from these countries in 2013 (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2014b) stands in marked contrast to the projections. Obviously, among 
other factors, the fi nancial and fi scal crisis starting in 2008, which affected Germany 
less than other EU member states, could not have been taken into account in these 
projections (but this and other factors may well change in the near future). Studies 
that quantify the degree of uncertainty with regard to projected migration fl ows in-
clude Alders et al. (2007). Their projections of international migration rely on expert 
judgments, the extrapolation of past trends, and ad-hoc assumptions about which 
countries are likely to receive below- or above-average levels of net migration (Al-
ders et al. 2007: 60). The limits of their 80 percent prediction interval for yearly net 
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migration to Germany until mid-century are –80,000 and 640,000, respectively. This 
illustrates why Brunborg and Cappelen (2010: 323) write that “with rapidly chang-
ing migration fl ows, the confi dence intervals easily become so large that they are 
of little or no value for users of the projections.” Given the diffi culties in predicting 
migration fl ows with a quantifi able degree of uncertainty, we consider it appropriate 
to make a point forecast based on fi xed parameters of immigration as a “what-if” 
scenario to complement the existing offi cial scenarios.
The starting point of the projection is the actual age pyramid of Germany as of 
December 31, 2012. Data from the 2011 census, as projected in Statistisches Bun-
desamt (2014a), have been combined with estimates on “migration backgrounds” 
among 5-year age groups from 2012 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a). The data on 
age cohort size for the total population were multiplied by two vectors contain-
ing the percentage values for foreign- and native-born residents of migration back-
ground, respectively, by age cohort. Missing values due to age cohort grouping 
were linearly interpolated. Hence, three separate matrices were obtained contain-
ing data for residents without “migration backgrounds”, foreign-born residents, and 
second-generation immigrants, respectively. Newcomers are added to the foreign-
born group; their children are members of the second-generation group, while their 
offspring in turn count as native (see 2.3). It should be noted that the population 
estimates based on the census of 2011 are signifi cantly (around 1.5 million) lower 
than the projections based on the census of 1987, which prevailed in offi cial publica-
tions and projections until mid-2013. As described above, the model differentiates 
between residents without “migration backgrounds,” immigrants (i.e. foreign-born 
residents) and second-generation immigrants (i.e. native-born residents with at 
least one foreign-born parent). Distinguishing between the two sexes within each 
of these groups resulted in six separate matrices. For reasons of space, the projec-
tion algorithms are given for females only in the following. The size of a future age 
cohort from the fi rst group is estimated as 
Na,t = Na,t-1 * Sa,t, for a > 0,
where Na,t is the number of native females without “migration backgrounds” of 
age a in year t, Sa,t is the age-specifi c survival rate for females (from Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2013e), varying by year as it has been linearly extrapolated to account 
for a rising life expectancy (see 2.2). The number of female newborns without “mi-
gration backgrounds” in a given year is estimated as 
where Fa is the age-specifi c fertility rate and Ma,t is the number of second-gener-
ation migrant women in a respective age group in year t, as their children (i.e. the 
third generation) are classifi ed as natives. This group, in turn, is equallyforward-
projected by 
Ma,t = Ma,t-1 * Sa,t, for a > 0,
(1)
(2)N0,t = ????? ??? ? ?????
??
???? ? ?????? ??? ? ?????
??
???? , 
(3)
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while 
is the number of births to foreign-born women Ia,t who count as second-generation 
migrants, given the differing age-specifi c fertility rate Ga for immigrant women. Fi-
nally, the foreign-born group grows by a yearly constant number of newcomers Ca,v, 
dependent on variant v and distributed across age groups:
Ia,t = Ia,t-1 * Sa,t + Ca,v, for a > 0,
I0,t = C0,v.
2.2 Underlying assumptions of the model
The parameters of the model have been mainly adjusted according to the medium 
or basic variants of the offi cial projections:
The total fertility rate is assumed to remain constant at the present level of 
roughly 1.4 children per woman, following the Federal Statistical Offi ce’s medium 
variant. Certainly, a TFR of 1.4 is not considered an inevitable fate and no policy rec-
ommendation is being made here to conceive it as such. Yet, existing (point) fore-
casts expect Germany’s TFR to remain at 1.4 until mid-century (Alders et al. 2007) 
or increase only marginally (to 1.47 by 2050 according to Eurostat, see Scherbov et 
al. 2008).4 Given the fact that the TFR “seems to have stalled at a level of 1.4 children 
since the 1970s” (Goldstein/Kreyenfeld 2011: 454), it appears reasonable to fi x this 
parameter for the present analysis. Age group-specifi c fertility rates are taken from 
the Human Fertility Database (2013) and are assumed to be distributed as in 2010. 
Further fertility postponement may occur as a result of, for example, the continu-
ing growth of participation in higher education (Ní Brolchaín/Beaujouan 2012). On 
the other hand, the pace of fertility postponement is declining and tempo effects 
are projected to disappear in the near future (Bongaarts/Sobotka 2012). The offi cial 
projections (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009) assume that the number of births to 
women aged 30 and over will rise, while the age-specifi c fertility rate for younger 
women is either assumed to decrease proportionately or over-proportionately or 
remain constant (which would result in a higher period TFR). As there is currently 
no coherent theory for the prediction of the future development of fertility, with 
(sociological, economic, or biological) arguments available in favor of both a rise as 
well as further decline (for an overview see Lutz 2006), for the sake of simplicity both 
period and cohort TFR are held constant in the present study. 
M0,t = ????? ??? ? ?????
??
????  (4)
(5)
(6)
4 Exceptions include the United Nations (2013: 75) who assume a rise in Germany’s TFR to 1.64 
by 2050, similar to the Federal Statistical Offi ce’s “higher variant.”
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Fertility patterns among native and migrant women are assumed to either re-
main constant (variant A), or fertility among foreign-born women will decline to 
1.4 children per woman (variant B). According to Statistisches Bundesamt (2012b: 
39), the total number of births to foreign-born women until the age of 39 was 1.9 
children on average. As the difference between native and foreign-born women has 
remained quite constant over the past decades (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012b), 
Variant A of the model assumes that this trend will continue. However, there are 
some reasons to expect immigrant women’s fertility rates to decline (see Schmid/
Kohls 2009 for an overview of the determinants of migrants’ reproductive behavior 
in Germany). Apart from a general fertility decline in most countries of origin and an 
expectable approximation of immigrant women to host country family customs, the 
growing share of central-eastern and south-eastern European immigrants, whose 
fertility rates are comparable to those among Germans, might lead to a convergence 
of birth rates among natives and immigrants (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012b: 23). 
For example, the completed fertility rate among migrant women aged 40 or older 
was 3.47 children for Turkish women compared to 1.53 children for Polish women 
(Schmid/Kohls 2009: 49). While Turks make up the largest group of foreign residents 
in Germany, Poland has been the number one country of origin for new arrivers in 
the past years. Fertility among migrants is thus likely to decline through this com-
position effect, in addition to other effects (e.g. socialisation). Therefore, the second 
variant assumes a fertility rate among the foreign-born of 1.4 children per woman, 
as for the current total population, with age-specifi c fertility rates equaling those of 
native women. It should be noted that the TFR for native women without “migrant 
backgrounds” might be below the threshold of 1.4, but no reliable data are avail-
able to distinguish native women with and without migration backgrounds. Second-
generation immigrant women (whose children count as natives without “migration 
backgrounds”) are assumed not to differ from native women with regard to period 
and cohort TFR due to a lack of reliable data on fertility among native-born women 
with “migration backgrounds.” 
Life expectancy is assumed to rise to about 87 years (85 for males and 89 for 
females) by 2050 according to the Federal Statistical Offi ce’s base assumption (Al-
ders et al. 2007 as well as Bijak et al. 2007, among others, project similar values). In 
the past, reality has disproved projections of a decreasing slope in the rise of life 
expectancy and the trend has instead been rather linear (Oeppen/Vaupel 2002). For 
the lack of a more plausible alternative assumption, the model specifi es a continu-
ously linear trend. The probability of surviving from birth to age 85 is thus assumed 
to be 50 percent in 2050 (up from 30.1 percent in 2011) for males and rises linearly 
until then. The same is true for females until the age of 89. Age-specifi c survival 
rates have therefore been multiplied by an interpolated factor such that survival 
rates linearly increase within each age group until reaching the target value for 
2050. Obviously, a rise in life expectancy will affect the age-specifi c survival rates of 
older age groups more than those of younger cohorts, which are already close to 1. 
Therefore, the infl ating factor has been weighted by an exponential weight variable 
to affect older age groups more than younger ones. As a result, for instance, the 
probability of surviving the next year for a 30-year-old male rises from 99.94 per-
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cent to 99.96 percent, whereas the same probability for an 85-year-old male rises 
from 89.1 percent to 92.1 percent.
Four different variants are calculated for external migration rates. Two of them 
correspond to the variants included in the Federal Statistical Offi ce’s offi cial projec-
tion, assuming annual net migration infl ows of 100,000 and 200,000, respectively. 
A high-migration variant assumes an annual net immigration of 300,000, based on 
recent trends in migration to Germany, whereas a zero variant assumes balanced 
external migration and is included for comparison. The 10th Coordinated Popula-
tion Projection, published in 2003 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2003), still included a 
variant assuming 300,000 immigrants per year, in light of an average annual net 
migration of 335,000 in the period of 1991 to 2000. The follow-up projections have 
dropped this variant given low immigration rates in the 2000s. Recent increases in 
net migration (see fi g. 1) suggest reconsidering the 300,000 variant. Changes in co-
hort size and age structure as a result of net immigration are supposed to be limited 
to foreign nationals, while external migration of native Germans is assumed to be 
balanced and without impact on the age structure. Note, however, that net migra-
tion of German nationals has been negative since 2005, but the data do not show a 
coherent trend. Migrants are assumed to continuously have the same age and sex 
distribution as the new arrivers in 2012 did (as reported in Statistisches Bundesamt 
2014c). Most migrants are males aged 20 to 24 (16 percent of all male immigrants), 
the modal value being 22 years. In total, 60.3 percent of all newcomers in 2012 were 
reported to be male.
3 Results
3.1 Total population size
Figure 2 shows the results of the projections, with the upper graph displaying the 
constant fertility variants (1A to 4A) while in the lower graph migrant women’s birth 
rates are assumed to decline to the present TFR among the total population in the 
future (variants 1B to 4B). As the graphs show, the model reproduces the Federal 
Statistical Offi ce’s forecasts for the annual net immigration assumptions of 100.000 
and 200.000, respectively (variants 2 and 3). Similar to the offi cial projections, a de-
Tab. 1: Overview of variants included in the projection model
TFR among migrant women
remains at 1.9 children declines to 1.4 children
External migration
zero net migration Variant 1A 1B
100,000 per year 2A 2B
200,000 per year 3A 3B
300,000 per year 4A 4B
Source: own design
•    Hannes Weber176
Fig. 2: Projections for Germany’s population (in millions) by mid-century
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clining population to between 67 and 72 million in 2050 is forecasted for these two 
scenarios. If Germany were to experience permanently higher immigration rates 
of around 300,000 per year, however, according to the projections the population 
would not signifi cantly decline by mid-century and would continue to be around 80 
million until 2050. After 2050, population decline is probably inevitable if fertility 
rates do not rise. Until then, Germany may achieve stationarity through immigration 
(cf. Schmertmann 1992), despite a then 80-year pattern of birth defi cit and death 
surplus. The lower graph in Figure 2 shows that the mid-century population can 
be expected to be slightly lower if fertility among native and migrant women con-
verges as opposed to the constant fertility variants. In the scenario where fertility 
among migrant women declines and external emigration is balanced, Germany’s 
population drops by more than 17 million to around 63 million by 2050. 
3.2 Old-age dependency ratio
With or without immigration, the percentage of retirees among the total population 
will greatly increase in the coming decades. As Figure 3 shows, the old-age de-
pendency ratio (the number of people aged 65 or older relative to the working age 
population of 15-64 years) is projected to rise from currently 0.31 to between 0.54 
(Variant 4A) and 0.66 (Variant 1B) by 2050. We can thus conclude that while high im-
migration rates could prevent population decline until around 2050, they would only 
mitigate the challenge of population ageing to a relatively small extent, even though 
new immigrants are signifi cantly younger than the resident population. This fi nd-
ing is consistent with the United Nations Population Division’s (2000) report about 
“replacement migration,” which in the year 2000 estimated that Germany needed 
344,000 immigrants per year to keep the population at a constant level until 2050, 
while an absurdly high annual infl ow of 3.6 million (or 181 million in total until 2050) 
would be needed to maintain the old-age dependency ratio at the 2000 level (for the 
development and public reception of this study, see Teitelbaum 2004; similar results 
have been obtained by Bijak et al. 2008). An annual net immigration rate of 300,000 
instead of 200,000 would result in six million additional people living in Germany, 
yet would lower the old-age dependency ratio by only 3-4 percent (see Appendix 
for details). From around 2035 on, the slope will be less steep in any case, as the 
cohorts reaching retirement age from then on are already post-baby boom. Starting 
in the late 2030s, all retirees will already have been born in the low-fertility period, 
so that the gap between the number of retirees and the number of young people en-
tering the workforce each year will be much smaller than in the period from 2025 to 
2035. The most challenging period of the demographic transition therefore certainly 
lies ahead for Germany, specifi cally in the next two decades.
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Fig. 3: Projected number of people aged 65 or older per resident in age group 
15 to 64
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3.3 Share of ethnic minorities
Figure 4 displays the projected impact of different scenarios of immigration and 
fertility rates on the ethnic makeup of Germany. While immigration can only mod-
erately affect Germany’s future age structure, the infl uence on the percentage of 
ethnic minorities is signifi cantly greater. In the high immigration and constant fertil-
ity scenario, fi rst- and second-generation migrants will make up 35 percent of the 
total population in 2050. With zero immigration and migrants’ fertility as low as 
natives’, the share of residents with “migration backgrounds” would stagnate at 
around 20 percent until mid-century. With future immigration rates as assumed in 
the offi cial projections (100,000 or 200,000), the share of fi rst- and second-genera-
tion migrants is projected to rise to 24 percent in the lowest (2B) and 29 percent in 
the highest variant (3A).5 Whether birth rates among migrant women remain at 1.9 
or decline to 1.4 children per woman has only a marginal impact on the projection 
results with regard to this indicator. If the third generation of migrants is included in 
the defi nition of “migration background” as well, then the share of the latter group 
rises above 40 percent in the high immigration scenario.
We must emphasize again that it is diffi cult to defi ne who belongs to an ethnic 
minority group and that patterns of subjective ethnic identifi cation may develop dif-
ferently. In case of ongoing net migration of a magnitude as in recent years, howev-
er, we can project that the share of the population with a foreign background will rise 
signifi cantly in the future, even if the third and later generations of immigrants or mi-
norities are defi ned as natives. Moreover, the distribution of immigrants and ethnic 
minorities will probably continue to be uneven across the country. The percentage 
of residents with “migration backgrounds” currently ranges from only around 1 per-
cent in some east German districts to more than 50 percent in the city of Offenbach 
near Frankfurt am Main. In many west and south German urban agglomerations 
such as Frankfurt am Main, Munich or Stuttgart, the majority of children today are 
already being born into migrant families.6 The possible economic (e.g., Rowthorn 
2008; Glitz 2012) or social (e.g., Schlueter/Wagner 2008; Eger 2012) implications of 
this trend are beyond the scope of this study. Yet from a demographic point of view, 
we can project that variance in future immigration rates will have a greater impact 
on the ethnic composition of society (as visualised by the diverging curves in Fig. 4) 
than on its age structure (and thus the dependency ratio). 
5 Lanzieri (2011) has somewhat higher results (32-39 percent residents of foreign origin in Ger-
many by 2051) with a number of yearly net infl ows fi xed at around 155,000 on average per year. 
The differences can probably be attributed to the divergent defi nitions of “foreign origin.” In 
the present study, around 4-6 percent of the projected population in 2050 is made up of third-
generation immigrants who are not included in the defi nition of “migration background” in Fig-
ure 4.
6 For the share of foreign nationals on local (NUTS-3) level, see Statistische Ämter des Bundes 
und der Länder (2013b). For the share of people and children with “migration backgrounds” in 
selected cities and regions, see Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2013a). The 
latter source is based on the micro-census survey, but several cities also use special software 
such as “MigraPro” to determine the number of residents with “migration backgrounds” from 
their register data. 
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Fig. 4: Projections for the share of people with “migration backgrounds” 
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4 Conclusions
Contrary to the widely held assumption, Germany’s population may not decline sig-
nifi cantly by mid-century. Ceteris paribus, an annual net immigration of 300,000 per 
year could prevent population decline until 2050 and cause the number of inhabit-
ants in Germany to stay roughly around 80 million. This would be the case if annual 
infl ows would be as high as in 2011-2013 (and during the 1990s). The share of fi rst- 
and second-generation immigrants would rise to around 35 percent by mid-century 
(or above 40 percent including the third generation). The economic and social con-
sequences of such an increase are disputed and cannot be assessed here, nor can 
we discuss the question whether it is ethically justifi able to draw on working-age 
immigrants to mitigate one’s own demographic problems, thereby potentially caus-
ing diffi culties in the countries of origin where these people may be needed as 
well. It is furthermore impossible to estimate the numerical likelihood of this higher 
net-infl ows scenario; but given the recent increase in net immigration to more than 
400.000 in 2013, the possibility should be considered. With less immigration, Ger-
many’s population would indeed decline. 
In any case, increased immigration rates could only slightly ease the problem of 
the sharp increase in the old-age dependent population in the coming decades. This 
increase is an obvious result of the baby boomer cohorts retiring between 2025 and 
2035. After this period, the gap between the annual number of retirees and the num-
ber of young people entering the workforce will abruptly decrease due to the fact 
that the retirees will themselves have been born in the era of below-replacement 
fertility. Increasing the annual number of immigrants from 200.000 (as in the Federal 
Statistical Offi ce’s high assumption) to 300.000 would result in a mere 3-4 percent 
decrease in the old-age dependency ratio by 2050, despite adding six million people 
to the total population. 
If a stationary total population by mid-century is considered desirable, immigra-
tion rates as high as in the 2011-2013 period are probably the only practicable means 
of achieving this goal. However, the main challenge arising from the demographic 
transition is arguably the rise in pensioners alongside the decline in the working-
age population rather than a reduction in the total population (which may, after all, 
involve some desirable effects as well in the eyes of the public). This challenge is 
probably best met by means other than (or in addition to) immigration, as the latter 
only affects the old-age dependency ratio to a limited degree. Such means may in-
clude increasing the labour market participation of older workers, as only about one 
in two men aged 55 to 64 in Germany is active in the labour force – a sharp decline 
since the 1970s and a considerably lower value than in other developed countries 
(Cooke 2006). Policy changes to reverse this trend have already been implemented, 
but with disputable effects so far (Buchholz et al. 2013). In total, the Federal Statisti-
cal Offi ce (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013c: 117) estimates an unused potential of 
almost seven million unemployed, underemployed and other non-active members 
of the labour force seeking work. This number is larger than the gap in the labour 
force that will occur when the baby boomer cohorts retire between 2025 and 2035. 
And since many of them are women, better opportunities to combine career and 
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children are an obvious measure that policymakers may want to pursue. Germany 
is still enjoying the “demographic dividend,” the concurrence of few children and a 
so far moderate number of old-age dependent persons. This will naturally change 
in the coming decades, but the major challenge will diminish after 2035. Until then, 
there appear to be suffi cient options to address the issues associated with a shrinking 
and aging population, including, but not limited to, a higher future net immigration.
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Fig. A1: Population pyramid of Germany in 2050 (High immigration variant 4A)
Note: The sudden increase in natives below the age of 38 is due to the projection defi ning 
second-generation migrants’ children as natives. See text for details.
Source: own projections
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Fig. A2: Population pyramid of Germany in 2050 (No immigration variant 1B)
Source: own projections
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